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The purpose of the present study was to examine the effects of 
possible factors on the rates of mental rotation from various 
researches being available to the author. The factors to be reviewed 
included stimulus types and their dimensionalities, response types, 
stimulus complexities, methods of stimulus presentations, and 
practice or other memorization procedures. The results indicated 
that the dimensionalities of stimuli predominantly determined the 
rates. Stimulus attributes like complexity and familiarity, as well 
as stimulus presentations and amount of practice also affected the 
rates. The results would indicate that there were systematic effects 
on the rates of mental rotation by various factors and thus vitiated 
the analog holistic position in the analog/propositional contro-
versy. It was also discussed that memorization should be an 
indispensable factor for the arguments of mental rotation experi-
mentation. 
Studies of mental rotation have been playing a central role in the 
fervent analog/propositional controversy over the internal representa-
tion. The controversy concerns what kind of information is unitized to 
internally represent an external object and how such a represented object 
can be internally operated. Both the analog and the propositional 




Sometimes, analog theorists, or imagists, take internal representations 
like perception. In this context, it is generally assumed that "the 
relational structure of the external events is essentially preserved in the 
corresponding relational structure of the internal representations" 
(Shepard, & Cooper, 1982, p.12-13) . From this definition the analog 
holistic position is derived : a represented object should internally preserve 
its integrity and coherency just as a real still object does. If internal 
representations in fact assume the same characteristics as perception, this 
coherency principle should be applicable even to a represented object in 
motion. 
The term "proposition" originated from philosophy, in which the term 
signifies a " statement whose truth or falsity can be evaluated by means of 
logic" (Webster's New World Dictionary, 1994) . However, in the analog 
/propositional arguments the propositional representations usually refer 
to " abstract language like entities that descnbe or assert facts" 
(Kosslyn, 1980, p.12) . In propositional representations an object to be 
represented has no analogous element in structures to a corresponding 
physical object. Thus, if a represented object is to be transferred, the 
internal process of transference should not be constrained by any physical 
law as the transference of a real object should by the law of motion. 
Johnson-Laird (1983) gave concise summaries of the respective 
positions concerning the internal representations (p.147-148) . 
Mental rotation studies started from a famous work by Shepard and 
Metzler (1971). Their newly devised stimuli were pairs of 3-D cranked 
blocks consisting of connected cubes projected onto two-dimensional plane 
(see Figure 1) . They found the time to judge whether one figure of a pair 
was identical or mirror reflected with the other monotonously increased 
as the angular disparity between the respective axes of the two figures 
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increased. Since then various types of stimuli have been employed to 
investigate the presence of this angular disparity effect. 
(a) 
(b) 
Figure l. Shepard-type block figures: (a) a reflected pair, (b) an 
identical pair. From Yuille, & Steiger (1982) , reproduced originallay 
from Shepard, & Metzler (1971). 
The irnagists took the presence of the angular disparity effect as 
evidence for the analog nature of internal representations. The result that 
continuously longer judgment time was consumed with the increase of 
angular disparities seemed to indicate that people can rotate images just 
like rotating physical objects. The early reports that the rates of mental 
rotation were not affected by stirnulus complexities (Cooper, 1975; 
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Cooper, & Podgorny, 1976) also bolstered the analog position because such 
constant rates can not seemingly be congruent with the propositional 
assum ption. 
Whereas, propositionists gave an alternative explanation to the angular 
disparity effect. Pylyshyn (1981) considered that people would make use 
of the knowledge of physical laws (called a tacit knowledge) when they 
are requested to mentally rotate objects. As people know physical 
rotation is a continuous process, they will simulate that the wider the 
disparity between two given objects are, the longer they require to judge 
the identity of the two objects. He also asserted that internal processings 
should not be analog in nature unless they are implemented by intrinsic 
knowledge-independent properties and biological mechanisms. If an 
outcome of an internal processing is swayed by higher order cognitive 
activities like knowledge, the processing is called " cognitively penetrable" 
and should be diagnosed as a propositional one (e.g., Pylyshyn, 1981; 
Pylyshyn, 1984) . Other propositionists were less radical. Some claimed 
that the detection of features rather than rotation should play the 
predominant role of figural identifications (e.g., Eley, 1982) , and others 
insisted the descriptions of stimuli precede the induction of mental 
rotation (e.g., Corballis & Nagourney, 1978; Corballis, Zbrodoff, Shetzer, 
& Butler, 1978) . 
Subsequently, the effect of stimulus complexity on the rate of mental 
rotation has been detected (e.g., Pylyshyn, 1979; Hochberg & Gellman, 
1977) . Such presence of the complexity effect seemed to be incompatible 
with the analog account in that it violates the coherency and integrality 
of represented objects by the analog holistic assumption. 
In this respect, the variability of the rate of mental rotation in relation 
to various experimental conditions, especially in relation to stimulus 
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complexity, has been one of the focal points in the arguments over the 
mode of internal representations. Hence, I would like to review the data 
available to me and to reevaluate the relationships between the rates of 
mental rotation and various experimental conditions. The rate of mental 
rotation is to be expressed by the slopes obtained either by the authors of 
articles themselves or by visual estimation from Ligures inserted in 
articles. The slopes obtained by the visual estimation, which are hereafter 
indicated by being asterisked, should of course be rough and inaccurate. 
However, in this review slope values are to be classified into three 
categories with their differential limits by power of 10 (i.e., more than 10 
ms/deg, or Category A; between I msldeg and 10 ms/deg, or Category 
~; and less than Ims/deg, or Category O , so fluctuations caused by the 
inaccurate visual estimation should be sufficiently small comparing with 
the wide categorical ranges. 
The conditions to be specified in this review include the dimensionalities 
(i.e., 3-D figures projected onto 2-D plane and 2-D figures on 2-D plane) , 
stimulus types (e.g., Shepard-type block figures, alphabets, random 
figures, symbol-1ike figures) , presentations of stimulus pairs (i.e., 
simultaneous presentations, sequential presentation, and single presenta-
tions of compared figures) , types of non-identical figures (i.e., mirror 
reflected versions of identical figures and other types of non-identical 
figures) , response types (i.e., identity judgments and object namings) , 
and other experimental specificities (e.g., amount of practice, stimulus 
complexities, axes of rotation) . Unless otherwise noted, the rates of 
mental rotation are only to be computed to the correct judgrnents of 




Category A: Rates of Rotation Higher Than 10 msldeg 
In Metzler and Shepard (1974) , which was the detailed version of 
Shepard and Metzler's (1971) initial report, they employed standard 3-D 
Shepard-type block figures (see Figure 1) as stimuli with the simultaneous 
presentations of stimulus pairs. Pairs consisted of identical figures and 
their mirror reflected versions. The subjects made extensive number of 
judgments (amount to 1600 trials) . In Experiment I the obtained slope of 
latencies against the angular disparities was 20.0 ms/deg* in the 
condition of the picture plane as the axis of rotation, and the slope was 
17.5 msldeg in the depth plane condition. In their Experiment 2 they 
attached end-of-structure signs to both end blocks of each figure. The 
slope in the picture plane condition was 21.6 ms/deg*, and that in the 
depth plane was 26.6 ms/deg*. 
Hochberg and Gellman (1977) invented 2-D antennal line figures as 
stimuli with their complexities defined by the nurnbers of antennas in the 
figures. Non-identical pairs consisted of standard figures and their 
mirror-reflected versions. The stimulus presentations were simultaneous. 
Although there existed individual differences, the slopes for complex 
figures varied from 12.5 to 18.7 ms/deg*. On the other hand, the slope 
for simple figures varied from 1.5 to 4 ms/deg*. 
In Experiment I of Yuille and Steiger's (1982) the stimulus pairs 
adopted were standard Shepard-type 3-D block figures, and presented 
pairs were either mutually identical or mirror reflected. The presenta-
tions of the stimuli were simultaneous and required rotation was vertical 
(around Y) axis. It must be noted that an inspection of only the bottom 
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half of a Shepard-type figure was sufficient to judge its (non-) identity 
with the partner of a pair. In other words, the standard Shepard-type 
figures afforded redundancy information. The subjects in the experirnen-
tal group were informed such redundancy information, whereas the 
subjects in the control group did not receive the redundancy information. 
The slope for the control group was 11.0 ms/deg, and for the experimen-
tal group it was 6.0 ms/deg. In Experiment 3 of the same study, the 
number of blocks of Shepard figures was extended from the original lO 
blocks to 17. The presentations of the stimuli were simultaneous, and 
each non-identical stimulus pair consisted of a standard figure and the 
figure whose top, or a middle, or bottom part was twisted in a different 
direction from the original standard. The obtained slope was 33 ms/deg. 
By comparing the standard Shepard figures with the extended ones, they 
claimed that the complexity effect was present. 
Experiment I of Steiger and Yuille's (1983) , investigating the effect of 
memorization of stimulus figures on the rate of mental rotation, divided 
the sub]ects mto "srmultaneous" condition and "memory" condition. The 
subjects in the memory condition studied simultaneously presented 
standard and mirror reflected Shepard's figures in practice, and then 
made standard/reflected judgments of singly presented figures in test. 
The slope for the simultaneous presentation was 10.2 msldeg and that 
for the memory condition was 2.1 ms/deg. 
Parsons (1987) systematically investigated the effect of the axes of 
rotation on the rates of mental rotations with the use of Shepard-type 
identical and mirror reflected pairs. The fastest rotation was obtained by 
the horizontal axis (15 msldeg) . The rotation by the vertical axis 
proceeded with the rate of 24 msldeg and that by the line of sight 29 
ms/deg. The rates of rotation by other non-canonical axes varied from 
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24 to 41 ms/deg. 
Experiment I of Just and Carpenter (1985) employed 3-D cubes 
projected onto 2-D plane as stimuli. Each of their surfaces was marked by 
an alphanumeric character. The task required of the subjects was the 
judgments of possible (non-) identities of simultaneously presented pairs 
of cubes in terms of alphanumeric marks. The subjects were free to choose 
any axis to rotate about. The slope for the subjects with low spatial 
ability was 55.5 ms/deg, whereas for subjects with high spatial ability it 
was only 8.3 ms/deg. 
Folk and Luce (1987) intended to effectively manipulate such experi-
mental factors as stimulus complexities and inter-stimulus similarities 
with the use of 2-D random polygons. The number of sides embedded in a 
polygon determined the complexity of the polygon. A non-identical pair 
consisted of a standard polygon and its mutant which was generated by 
the perturbation on the locations of the respective vertices of the 
standard. The amount of the perturbation determined the degree of 
similarity between a standard and a mutant. The preparatory rotation 
method was employed in the experiment in which each subject was 
requested to perform mental rotation of an initially presented standard 
figure for a specific angle and then he/she was to make an identity 
judgment with a subsequently presented compared figure. The rate of 
mental rotation was measured by the latency of preparatory rotation. 
The results indicated that the slope for complex stimulus pairs with high 
similarity was 38 ms/deg* , and that for simple pairs with low similarity 
was 20 ms/deg*. 
Bethell-Fox and Shepard (1988) used a new stimulus type of random 
filled-in matrices in order to control the figural complexity. The 
familiarity with stimulus figures in terms of the amount of practice was 
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also controlled. The preparatory rotation method was employed to 
measure the rates of mental rotation. In the condition of complex stimuli 
with little practice the slope was 49 ms/deg. In their extensive practice 
conditions the slopes were less than 10 ms/deg (i.e., for complex figures, 
9.2 ms/deg; for simple figures, 4.8 ms/deg) . 
Category ~: Rates of RotatiorL ~etweel~ 1 msldeg and 10 msldeg 
Cooper and Shepard (1973) , using alphanumerics as stimuli, asked 
subjects whether the presented disoriented characters were normal or 
reflected versions. The obtained slope from the characters' upright 
position was 3.0 ms/deg'. When the preparatory rotation paradigm was 
applied as the presentation, the slope from their upright position was 2.2 
msldeg * . 
Cooper (1975) attempted to clarify the effect of figural complexity on 
the rate of mental rotation of random polygons. One of the outstanding 
characteristics of this study was that the subjects were exposed to specific 
stimulus figures in extremely large number of times (i.e., each subject 
made more than 4800 judgments about eight standard polygons and their 
reflections) . In Experiment I the subjects memorized eight standard 
polygons at the upright position and then were required to determine 
whether a presented compared figure was a standard or a reflected 
version. The obtained slope for the standard was 2.1 ms/deg. At the 
same time no cornplexity effect was found. In Experiment 2, where the 
preparatory rotation paradigm was adopted, the slope for the prepara-
tion was 2.7 ms/deg. 
In Cooper and Podgorny's (1976) subjects were required to discriminate 
memorized standard random polygons from their perturbed ones by the 
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preparatory rotation method. The results showed that, while the time for 
the judgments stayed constant whether they were identical or not, the 
preparatory rotation time increased linearly with the increase of angular 
departure from the memorized positions of the standards (i.e., 1.6 ms/ 
deg'). However, it must be noted that the subjects of this study were 
same in Cooper's (1975) and thus had extensive exposure to the kind of 
stimuli and to the experimental situation. 
In Experiment 2 of Eley's (1982) subjects were required to memorize the 
labels of unfamiliar letter-like symbols in training blocks. Then in each 
trial of experimental blocks each subject was asked to determine whether 
a singly presented symbol was normal or reflected. The obtained slope 
was 4.3 ms/deg*. 
As was already mentioned in Category A, the experimental group of 
Experiment I of Yuille and Steiger's (1982) , which received the redun-
dancy information about Shepard-type block figures, showed its slope 6.0 
ms/deg. Also having been mentioned, the memory condition of 
Experiment I of Steiger and Yuille (1983) , in which procedure Shepard-
type figures had been memorized prior to their standard/reflected 
judgments, yielded its slope 2.1 ms/deg. 
Robertson and Palmer (1983) invented a new stimulus type of large 
sized capital letters F, R, reflected F, and reflected R (called global 
letters) made of smaller sized letters F, R, and their reflections (called 
local letters) . The task in Experiment 1, using the simultaneous presenta-
tion, required of the subjects to respond "yes" if the global, the local, or 
both global and local aspects were normal letters. The slope when letters 
at the local aspect were normal was 1.1 ms/deg*, at the global aspect 1.2 
ms/deg*, and at both aspects 0.8 ms/deg*, respectively. 
In Experiment 1, Corballis and McLaren (1984) tirned the judgments 
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about stylized alphabetsps and qs (or equivalently, bs and ds) in different 
angular orientations. There were four conditions: (a) each letter was to 
be identified as a b or a d, (b) each was to be identified as ap and a q, (c) 
each was to be identified as a b and a p, and (d) each was to be identified 
as a d or a q. The conditions (a) and (b) concerned left-right discrimina-
tions, and the conditions (c) and (d) up-down discriminations. The slope 
concerning the up-down discriminations was 1.7 ms/deg*, and the slope 
concerning the left-right discriminations 2.2 ms/deg*. In Experiment 3 
the researchers presented subjects with nonverbal patterns each of which 
consisted of a straight line with a dot located to one side and toward one 
end. Hence, the nonverbal patterns were equivalent to p, q, d, and b in 
which the rounded parts of these alphabets were replaced with the dots. 
The slope for the top-bottom discriminations was 1.3 ms/deg* and that 
for the left-right discriminations 1.8 ms/deg*. 
Shepard, S. and Metzler, D. (1988) orthogonally varied dimensionality 
of objects (i.e., 2-D vs. 3-D) and type of tasks (i.e., simultaneous 
presentation vs. single presentation) in their experiment. For the 2-D 
condition the discriminations of random polygons from their reflected 
versions were required and for the 3-D condition identity-reflection 
discriminations with the use of reduced Shepard-type block figures 
(consisting of 7 blocks instead of standard 10 blocks) were conducted. As 
to single presentation paradigm, the obtained slopes were 2.1 msldeg for 
2-D objects and 2.9 ms/deg for 3-D objects, respectively. Likewise, 
concerning the simultaneous presentation, the slopes were 6.4 msldeg for 
2-D objects and 7.7 msldeg for 3-D objects, respectively. 
In Jolicouer's (1985) subjects were asked to name as quickly as possible 
drawings of natural objects. In Experiment 2 the slopes dropped both 
with practice (i.e., 1.4 ms/deg' for Ist block and 0.4 ms/deg' for the 
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3rd block) and with stimulus familiarity (i.e., 0.9 ms/deg* for unfamil-
iar objects and 0.5 ms/deg* for familiar objects) . In Experiment 4 he 
made use of left/right decision task to the same stimuli as in Experiment 
2 and obtained the slope of 2.3 ms/deg*. 
Corballis and Cullen (1986) asked subjects to decide the location of an 
asterisk placed to the left, right, top, or bottom of each disoriented 
alphabet (Experiment 1) , and of each disoriented unfamiliar architectural 
symbol (Experiment 3) . In Experiment 1, the slopes obtained for 
left-right decisions were around 1.8 msldeg irrespective of structures of 
alphabets (i.e., they classified stimulus alphabets into vertically symmet-
rical letters, horizontally symmetrical letters, and asymmetrical letters) , 
whereas the slopes for top-bottom decisions ranged 0.4 msldeg and 0.7 
msldeg according to the structures. As for Experiment 3 the slopes 
varied very widely according to the structures (0.5 ms/deg to 2.1 
ms/deg) in top-bottom decisions. For left-right decisions the slopes 
became more converged on I msldeg (i.e., 0.9 ms/deg and 1.2 ms/deg) . 
Maki (1986) had subjects name outline drawings of common objects. 
Experiment I consisted of four blocks of 24 trials with each block 
containing all stimulus pictures once. The average slope was 1.9 ms/deg. 
However, when looking at slopes at respective blocks, the practice effect 
seemed evident (i.e., 1.5 ms/deg' for the Ist block; 0.3 ms/deg' for the 
second, third and fourth blocks collapsed) . In Experiment 2 she asked 
subjects to decide whether or not two simultaneously presented symmetri-
cal pictures would face in the same direction had one (i.e., the compared) 
picture been turned to its upright position. Thus the task was identity-
reflection discriminations. The average slope was 1.9 ms/deg'. 
Takano (1989) proposed a theory of information types based on five 
consecutive experiments. In Experiment I a target figure consisting of 
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line segments and a box derived three distractor figures. The three 
distractors and their respective condition names were: the reflection of a 
target figure (Relative Orientation condition) , the substitution of a 
curved line for a-line segment (Identity condition) , and the reflection of 
the line segments but the conservation of the location of the box (C 
ombination condition) . At the onset of the experiment, the subjects were 
asked to copy the upright target on paper with pencils. For the simulta-
neous presentation, where the target and either the target or one of the 
distractors were presented side by side, the slopes were 3.6 ms/deg* for 
the RO condition, 0.3 ms/deg* for the condition C, and near O ms/ 
deg* for the condition I, respectively. For the single presentation 
paradigm, where either the target or a distractor was singly presented, 
the slope was 3.2 ms/deg' for the RO condition, and near O ms/deg' for 
both C and I. Thus as far as the C and I conditions in both simultaneous 
and single presentations were concerned, the slopes belonged to the 
Category C. In Experiment 2 he employed a Chinese character as a 
standard figure and its partially transformed version (C) and its 
reflection version (RO) as non-identical compared figures. In a three-
session experiment the subjects were required to make simultaneous 
presentations at the session I and single presentations at the sessions 2 
and 3. The subjects were classified into two groups: an irtstructed group 
whose subjects were informed of the presence of a C change in the 
transformed version and a r~on-i7bstructed group which did not receive such 
information. The slope at the first session of the i7~structedgroup was 1.8 
ms/deg' and it was nearly identical to that at the first session of the 
/~0rt-irbstructed group. However, as to the third session, the slope for the 
non-instructed group was 1.2 msldeg and for the instructed group the 
slope was almost flat. 
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Paquet (1991) examined whether or not mental rotation of compound 
stimuli is holistic. The employed stimuli were those of Robertson and 
Palmer's (1983) . Under the divided attention task the subjects were 
instructed to respond "yes" if the global aspect (the global-only condi-
tion) , the local aspect (the local-only condition) or both aspects (the both 
condition) were normal letters. The focused attention task of the 
global-directed session required of the subjects to decide whether the 
global aspect was normal letters irrespective of the local letters. 
Likewise, the local-directed session required of the subjects only to decide 
the versions of the local letters. The slopes for the both, the global-only 
and the local-only conditions under the divided attention task were 3.6 
ms/deg, 5.0 ms/deg, and 5.5 ms/deg, respectively. Under the focused 
attention task the slopes for the both and the global-only conditions in the 
global-directed session were 2.7 msldeg and 2.7 ms/deg, and the slopes 
for the both and the local-only conditions in the local-directed session 
were 3.0 ms/deg and 2.9 ms/deg, respectively. 
Corballis and Corballis (1993) asked subjects to judge whether a small 
bar perpendicular to one side of a clock hand would point left or right if 
the hand had been pointing at the 12:OO position. The clock hand was 
shown in two successive orientations 30 ' apart, and thus induced 
apparent motion. The bar appeared at the first presentation of the clock 
hand on half of the trials and at the second presentation of the clock hand 
on the other half of trials. Obtained latencies against the angular 
departures of the bar from the upright position showed that the subjects 
mentally rotated the clock hand before making the decisions. At the same 
time, it was found that the apparent motion dragged the orientation from 
which the clock hand was mentally rotated. Mental rotation of the clock 
hand was not affected by this drag when the bar appeared at the second 
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presentation. In the second presentation condition the slope was 2.8 
ms/deg* when the direction of the apparent motion was clockwise, and 
2.3 ms/deg' when the direction was counterclockwise. 
Cohen and Kubovy (1993) systematically investigated the effects of 
experimental paradigms, stimulus types, stimulus complexities and other 
factors on the rates of rotation in their Experiment 1. As to the 
experimental paradigms, the slopes were greatest for the simultaneous 
presentation (i.e. , 2.9 ms/deg) , intermediate for the sequential presenta-
tion (i.e., 1.7 ms/deg) , and smallest for the preparatory rotation 
paradigm (i.e., 0.2 ms/deg) . There was no difference of slopes between 
random matrices and random polygons (1.4 msldeg vs. 1.8 ms/deg) . 
Here, it is necessary to note that the authors used only two polygons and 
two matrices as standards. Complexity had no effect on slope either (1.6 
msldeg for simple figures vs. 1.6 ms/deg for complex figures) . In 
Experiment 2 still using only two standard polygons, subjects were given 
pressure to hasten identity-reflection discrirninations while maintaining 
error rates low (RT pressure) . The slope was 0.7 ms/deg for simultane-
ous presentation and -0.08 msldeg for sequential presentation. In 
Experiment 4 they generated total of 1440 simple and complex polygons as 
standards. Under RT pressure the slope was 3.9 msldeg while when there 
was no pressure the slope was 7.6 ms/deg. Still no complexity effect was 
f ound. 
Several derivative conditions of Category A studies had the rates of 
rotation below 10 ms/deg: discriminations of Shepard-type block figures 
with redundant information (Yuille, & Steiger, 1982) , and with memori-
zation procedure (Steiger, & Yuille, 1983) ; identity judgrnents of cubes in 
terms of surface information by subjects with high spatial ability (Just, 
& Carpenter, 1985) ; identifications of random matrices after extensive 
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practice (Bethell-Fox, & Shepard, 1988) ; and discriminations of simple 
antennal line figures from their mirror reflections (Hochberg, & Gellman, 
1977) . 
Category C.' Rates of Rotation Less Thart 1.0 msldeg 
Corballis, Zbrodoff, Shetzer and Butler (1978) had subjects make timed 
decisions about alphanumerics. In Experiment I the subjects were asked 
to name singly presented normal and backward characters in two blocks 
which contained 72 characters each. The angular disparity effect was only 
significant for backward characters in the block I (slope=0.3 ms/deg*) . 
The effect was not significant for normal characters in the block I nor for 
either versions in the block 2 (i.e., the slopes were assumed to be nil) . In 
Experirnent 3 there were two different tasks: identification task and 
orientation task. The identification task requested each subject to press 
one button whenever a given goal character (both normal and backward) 
appeared and to press the other button in all other cases. In the orienta-
tion task each subject was assigned a given orientation in advance and 
told to press one button whenever a character appeared in that orientation 
regardless of the character. As to the identification task the slopes were 
0.5 ms/deg* for backward versions and 0.3 ms/deg* for normal 
versions. For the orientation task, although ANOVA showed a signifi-
cant angular effect, the results gave bimodal distribution of latencies 
against angular disparities irrespective of versions (peaked at 60' and 
300' ) . Thus respective inspections of the latencies to both versions 
yielded near flat slopes. 
In Corballis and Nagourney's (1978) subjects were instructed to decide 
whether a presented alphanumeric was a letter or a digit. The latencies 
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against the angular disparities from the characters' upright position 
showed that in the range of O' and 300' they were virtually flat except at 
240' where there was a sudden jump. In this respect no angular disparity 
effect was observed in the letter-digit decision task. 
Experiment I of Eley's (1982) required of subjects to name unfamiliar 
letter-1ike syrnbols whose labels had been learned in training (see Category 
B for his Experiment 2) . Two variables were taken into account beside 
angular disparity: symbol familiarity and identification set size. 
Naming was faster for symbols in a small set size but the familiarity did 
not have an effect. Although angular disparity effect was detected by 
ANOVA, the inspection of the latencies indicated almost flat slopes. 
As was already mentioned in Category ~, Jolicoeur (1985) made use of 
drawings of natural objects as stimuli. In Experiment I subjects were 
instructed to name water color drawings of natural objects. The stimuli 
were divided into six blocks of 36 trials. The slope for the first block was 
0.6 ms/deg' while that for the sixth block approxirnated to nil. 
Therefore evidently there was the practice effect. Such decrement of 
latencies below 1.0 msldeg was also observed in the practice condition 
(0.4 ms/deg*) and familiarity condition (0.5 ms/deg') in Experiment 2. 
McMullen and Jolicoeur (1992) employed line drawings of objects as 
stimuli. Three different tasks were assigned to each subject in Experiment 
l. In top-bottom discrimination task the subjects were instructed to 
enuncaate "top" or "bottom" to mdicate the location of a mark which 
appeared in the proximity of top or bottom of each disoriented object. In 
old narning task the subjects were asked to narne objects which they had 
already seen in the top-bottom discriminations. In new naming task the 
objects to be presented had not been used in the top-bottom discrimina-
tions. As for the top-bottom discriminations the slope of latencies 
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against the angular disparities from the objects' upright position was 0.6 
ms/deg*, and for the naming (including both old and new objects) the 
slope was 0.6 ms/deg*. And thus there was no difference in the effect of 
orientation across tasks. However, the effect of stimulus orientation was 
smaller for the old naming task than for the new naming task (0.3 ms/ 
deg* for the former slope, and 0.6 ms/deg* for the latter) . 
Some conditions of Category ~ studies yielded the slopes less than 1.0 
ms/deg. Such were, for exarnple, top-bottom decisions of alphabets 
(Corballis, & Cullen, 1986) ; naming of common objects after extensive 
practice (Maki, 1986) ; discrimination of a curved line from a straight line 
(condition ~ and judgment of the location of a box whether at the end of 
a line segment or at the intersection of two lines (condition O (Takano, 
1989) ; and discriminations of overlearned standard random polygons 
under the pressure to hasten response (Cohen, & Kubovy, 1993) . 
Evaluations 
Dilnensionalities and Types of Stimuli 
One of the predominant factors to influence the rates of mental 
rotation was the dimensionalities of stimulus figures. In Category A, six 
out of nine experiments were those with 3-D stimulus figures projected 
onto the 2-D plane. In Category ~, where 26 experiments were listed, 
there were only three experiments with the use of 3-D dimensional 
figures. And there was no case of 3-D stimuli in Category C. 
Dimensionalities and types of stimulus figures were closely related. 
The 3-D studies were almost limited to those used by the Shepard-type 
block figures with the only exception of Just and Carpenter's (1985) cube 
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manipulations. For 2-D studies stimuli could roughly be divided into 
two groups: nonsense stimuli and meaningful (or well-known) stimuli. 
Random polygons, random matrices and antennal figures were in the 
former group, while the latter group typically included alphanumerics and 
drawings of common and well-known objects. Although studies with the 
use of nonsense stimuli and those with meaningful stimuli were inter-
mixed in Category 1~, studies in Category C employed predorninantly 
meaningful stimuli. There were a few 2-D experiments in Category A but 
these experiments all used nonsense stimuli. Thus it seems evident that 
mental rotation would be facilitated when stimuli are meaningful and 
slowed when they were nonsense. 
Practice 
Practice had a clear decrernental effect on the rates of mental rotation. 
Comparing Cohen and Kubovy's (1993) Experiment 4 with their 
Experiment 1, it seems evident that memorization of specific stimuli 
contributed to the faster rotation. However, it would be noteworthy that 
the practice effect was still observed in object naming tasks (e.g., 
Jolicoeur, 1985; Maki, 1986) even though the association between the 
internal representations of common objects and their names should have 
been sufficiently established. For these tasks the memorization of stimuli 
should not be considerable for the cause of the faster rotation. Rather, 
the formation of stronger connections between internal representations 
and corresponding motor responses would better explain the reduction of 
the slopes. Thus, that the identifications of alphanumerics and namings 
of common objects were in the fastest category of rotation (e.g., 
Corballis, Zbrodoff, Shetzer, & Butler, 1978; Eley, 1982; Maki, 1986) 
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would comprehensively be explained by the overlearning and complete 
memorization of these items on the one hand and by the already existed 
strong connection between the memorized items and motor responses to 
them (i.e., implicit or explicit utterance of names and labels) on the 
other. 
Complexit y 
Despite the initial reports of the absence of the complexity effect by 
Cooper (1975) and others, subsequent studies gave strong evidence for the 
presence of the effect (e.g., Yuille, & Steiger, 1982; Folk, & Luce, 1987; 
Bethell-Fox, & Shepard, 1988; Pellegrino, Doane, Fischer, & Alderton, 
1991) . However, more recent study by Cohen and Kubovy (1993) could not 
find the effect. On this point one note will be worth: beside the argument 
that complexity effect directly reflects the nature of internal processing, 
which is the basic tenet of the propositionists, a certain alternative 
explanation seems possible for the occurrence of the complexity effect. In 
this respect, it would be necessary to scrutinize the experimental condi-
tions when the effect appeared and when not. 
Most prominent characteristic of the experiments reporting the absence 
of the effect (including Cohen, & Kubovy's) was that specific standard 
stimuli were exposed to subjects with extensive repetition. On the other 
hand, most experiments showing the presence of the effect used many 
standard figures, by which relatively good control of stimulus specific 
factors was obtained. Thus, at least as far as 2-D figures and symbols are 
concerned, repeated presentations of unstable and fragmented representa-
tions about a complex figure will work to combine themselves into a 
unitized representation. If such unitization occurs, the speed and 
- 160 -
MENTAL ROTATION 
efficiency of the processing will increase, and there will be no more 
complexity effect beyond when the speed comes to be asymptotic. This 
inference based on the degree of memorization is in accord with the results 
concerning the practice effect and the complexity effect and also relevant 
to the effect of stimulus presentations. 
Stimulus Presentatior~s 
As Cohen and Kubovy (1993) explicitly noted, the slopes obtained in the 
simultaneous presentation paradigm were greater than those obtained in 
the single presentation paradigm. In most naming tasks the slopes were 
in the category of fastest rotation. This order of the rates of rotation is 
consistent with the just stated memorization account. However, these 
results should not be a surprise when we design experiments with the use 
of stimuli having varying degrees of familiarity. The sirnultaneous 
presentation is generally required for unfamiliar stimuli because this 
paradigm enables subjects to make concurrent checking on both a 
standard and a compared figure. The quality of both (or at least 
standard) figures in representation need not be high. Whereas, for the 
single presentation paradigm to be feasible, standard figures must have 
been firmly established in representation prior to the comparison time. 
For their firm establishment, the procedures like extensive memorization 
and practice on a small number of figures are usually necessary. As to the 
narning task of alphanumerics and common objects, subjects have 
abundant experience to encounter such symbols and objects in their daily 
lives, and thus their representations have been sufficiently established 




To sum up, the more is an object in representation firmly established 
via memorization, however complex it is, the more will it be unitized as a 
holistic entity. Consequently, the decline of the slope will come about. 
For example, when rotation of many standard polygons is requested, or 
inversely, each polygon is rather poorly memorized, the rotation generally 
takes more than 20 ms/deg (see Folk, & Luce, 1987) . But the rate will 
drastically decline to less than 1.0 ms/deg, or to the level of the 
identifications of alphanumerics and common objects, when only two 
highly memorized random polygons are used as standard stimuli (see 
Cohen, & Kubovy, 1993) . The implication seems clear: the rate of 
rotation is determined by the degree of memorization, or the degree of 
cohesiveness, of a represented object. 
Other Factors 
Researchers have asserted that other factors like redundancy informa-
tion (Yuille, & Steiger, 1982) , spatial abilities (Just, & Carpenter, 1985) , 
attention (Podgorny, & Shepard, 1983; Paquet, 1991) , and RT pressure or 
the pressure to urge quick responses (Cohen, & Kubovy, 1993) should be 
involved in determining the rates of mental rotation. 
Subjects' ability to make use of redundancy information would be 
favorable to the propositional position in that possessing the knowledge 
about a part figure facilitates the rate of mental rotation which should be 
indivisible and cohesive by the analog holistic assumption. Yet, there is 
an alternative explanation. That is to say, it may not be the knowledge 
by itself but a highly resolved image of a part figure that facilitates 
mental rotation. This explanation necessitates to loosen the imagists' 































upheld. However, as far as the data obtained in this study are concerned, 
it is indeterminate whether the modified analog explanation or the 
propositional explanation should be more plausible. 
However, these experimental / stimulus variables do not seem to 
influence the internal representations and processings separately but do 
them interactively. Or in some cases, an apparent effect of some variable 
might better be conceived as a manifestation of the effect of other more 
fundamental variable. What has become sufficiently clear is the flexibil-
ity of the cognitive system to accommodate vastly different types of 
stimuli in completely different experimental settings and procedures. 
Nonetheless, the system can perform very efficiently to reach correct 
identifications and judgments. Especially important role seems to be 
played by memorization. Although the effect of stimulus memorization 
has often been a focus of mental rotation experiments, scarcely has the 
metamorphic aspect of memorization in cognitive activities been argued. 
In this respect, without sufficiently controlling the memorization factor, 
any claims about mental representations and processings will become 
futile in future researches. 
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